This journal assignment is a formative assignment for the current .docx

This journal assignment is a formative assignment for the
current module. The assignment requires that you prepare ONE
200-250-word statement in paragraph form to present a snapshot
of:
· your point of view (POV) about the module topic (identify
this before turning to the assigned reading)
· key evidence and themes pertaining to the module topic that
stands out to you upon completing the assigned reading (include
endnotes to cite the information you are extracting from the
reading)
· a concluding comment and/or question that captures an aspect
of your POV after reading the assigned chapter.
The module topic is Regionalism and Internationalism
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r
A NATION DIVIDED:
The Quest for Caribbean Integration
W. Marvin Will
University of Tulsa
Recognizing that the traditional five-state subregion of Central
America departed from European colonialism as a federated
entity, Ralph
Lee Woodward subtitled his seminal history of Central America
"A Nation
Divided." In his view, "the social and economic history of the
isthmus
suggests that its peoples share considerably in their problems
and circum-
stances, even though their political experience has been diverse.
But it is
also clear that their social and economic unity has been limited
by their
political disunity" (Woodward 1985, vii). Following a period of
colonial
tutelage equal to that of Hispanic Central America, the
Commonwealth
Caribbean or English-speaking Caribbean also began to edge
away from
colonization as a federation of ten nations: Jamaica, Trinidad
and Tobago,
Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-
Anguilla, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent, and Montserrat. Applying Woodward's
criteria, these

former British colonies in the West Indies appear to have an
even stronger
claim than Hispanic Central America to substantial past and
future na-
tional integration. According to Jamaican-American historian
Franklin
Knight and theorist Gordon Lewis, this subregion demonstrates
more
cultural and physical commonalities than differences (Knight
1978, x-xi;
G. Lewis 1983). Despite the frictions induced by negotiations
for indepen-
dence, substantial regional integration of the nation-states of
the English-
speaking Caribbean was achieved during the late 1960s and
early 1970s.
These efforts atrophied in the years prior to 1987, however,
because of
internal divisions and external pressures.
In attempting to explain past failures and present efforts, this
article will draw in part on several propositions set forth by
political
sociologist Amitai Etzioni in Political Unification: the fewer the
national
units to be integrated, the more successful the integration
movement;
enhanced communication and political representation aid
integration;
and if regional integration does not occur prior to the -rise of
individual

nation-state sovereignty and national pride, the next critical
juncture for
such development tends to occur after the systems have
weakened (Etzi-
oni 1965, 94-96). If indeed the third generalization is relevant
to the
Caribbean, then the severe downturns in the political economies
of much
3
Latin American Research Review
80 72
United
States THE CARIBBEAN
'Al
~~~Atlantic
Ocean
~~~ o ~~~~~0 100 200 300 Miles
0 100200300 Kilometers
Dominican
Jaac Ha. epublic
Puerto
Rico 5t. Kit'tV-Antigua

Nevis
16-
Caribbean Sea <jDominica
9S aint Lucia
St. Vincent, t~
Barbados
DGrenada
c: Trinidad aind Tobago
Panama Venezuela
80 Colombia 64uan
FIGURE 1 The Caribbean
of the region during the 1980s may yet produce positive
regional benefits
by inducing efforts toward integration. It might be generalized
that this
outcome appears all the more possible because of a substantial
trend in
regional leadership patterns toward younger, more pragmatic
individ-
uals. Expanded membership in the subregional community, in
contrast,
would probably tend to retard the integration process.
This article also hypothesizes that this group of small nations
will
remain only partially linked in the near future due to

metropolitan influ-
ences, cultural parochialism, and the personal and turf-
protective policies
of some insular leaders. These same factors appear to have
ensured the
failure of previous integration attempts in the Commonwealth
Caribbean.
Finally, should present integration efforts fail, it is highly
probable that
efforts at integration will be renewed. But before pursuing these
hypoth-
eses, a backward glance is in order.
4
CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION
THE COLONIAL LEGACY
Viewed from outer space or a superjet flying over the seldom-
out-
of-sight Lesser Antilles, the dots of emerald, coral, lava, and
sediment
that lie below in seemingly close proximity can be readily
perceived as
natural candidates for integration (see figure 1). Indeed, some
degree of
unity existed among the Taino-Arawak and Carib tribes in these
territories
prior to the imposed Iberian order that linked the region legally

until the
early seventeenth century.
Between the 1620s and the turn of the twentieth century, a
British
West Indies developed among these territories partially because
of almost
continuous European-Caribbean wars. One colonial official,
James Pope-
Hennessy, referred to the British West Indies as "pieces in
Elizabethan
schemes of empire, objects of Caroline and Cromwellian
enterprise, [and]
loot of eighteenth-century wars" (cited in Bolitho 1947, 174).
As a result, the
twelve independent states and five dependent territories now
comprising
the English-speaking or Commonwealth Caribbean had imposed
on them a
new colonial order involving a harbinger of integration (see
table 1).
FACTORS THAT DIVIDE: THE POLITICS OF
DISINTEGRATION
Cultural and Developmental Problems
Integration, however, implies far more than a common
sovereign.
Integrated status is achieved only with great difficulty, as
evidenced by

the experience of contemporary multistate efforts at integration.
Its com-
plexity is also evident in theory, as reflected in Bela Balassa's
five-step
integration typology (Nye 1971, 29). 1 Whether it is attempted
at the level
of a single island or a great or small archipelago, integration
relies on
shared feelings or attitudes toward unification and identity that
grow
from actual or imagined common experiences. In the Caribbean,
such
attitudes have not been strongly developed even among the
Caribbean
colonies of single European states because of the vagaries of
nature and
geographical distance. Moreover, the colonizing countries
compounded
1. The Balassa ideal type of integration model suggests a wide
range: from free trade (no
internal tariffs, a condition reached with great difficulty, as so-
called free-trade zones and
even the several de jure, but not de facto, common markets
suggest), to de facto common
markets (with a common external tariff), to "unification of
policies [and] political institu-
tions" (Nye 1971, 29). Multistate political mergers occur only
rarely, and as Nye observes,

"political integration is by far the most ambiguous and the most
difficult for which to develop
satisfactory indices" (Nye 1971, 36). He perceives major
problems in the Balassa "list" but
cites it for heuristic appeal. For the Balassa taxonomy to be
relevant to Caribbean integration,
however, one or more new first steps and perhaps an
intermediate step would be necessary
to reflect more accurately the de facto pre-free-trade and pre-
common-market realities expe-
rienced in the Caribbean. Policy harmonization categories two
and three (common external
tariffs and free flow of factors) probably should be collapsed,
and language changes must be
made throughout Balassa's classification system, especially in
the final integrative category.
5
TA B L E 1 Economic Indicators of Caribbean Countries in
1988
Annual
Rate of
Population Average
Area Mid-Year Increase Labor
(in square Population 1985-88 Force
Country kilometers) in 1988 (%) 1988

Anguilla 91 7,300 1.3
Antigua and
Barbuda 440 77,900 1.0
Bahamas 13,942 244,600 2.0 124,300
Barbados 431 253,800 0.1 123,800
Belize 22,960 179,600 2.6
British Virgin
Islands 150 12,400 1.4
Cayman Islands 260 24,900 6.2
Dominica 750 81,200 0.6
Grenada 345 99,200 2.1
Guyana 214,970 755,800 -0.1
Jamaica 11,424 2,356,600 0.7 1,078,400
Montserrat 102 12,000 0.3
St. Kitts
and Nevis 269 43,000 -0.8
St. Lucia 616 145,400 2.0
St. Vincent and
the Grenadines 388 113,100 1.1
Trinidad
and Tobago 5,128 1,211,500 1.6 476,800
Turks and Caicos

Islands 417 14,000 11.9
Source: Adapted from Caribbean Development Bank, Annual
Report, 1989 (St. Michael,
Barbados: Leachworth Press, 1989), p. 15, with the permission
of the Caribbean
Development Bank.
the problem by inducing destructive racial and class divisions,
imposing
Eurocentristic and often ethnocentristic educational programs,
and erect-
ing political, linguistic, monetary and trade barriers. As Daniel
Guerin
observed, "Cut off, withdrawing into themselves, the islands'
'insularity'
[and] stagnation [resulted]. Even when attached to the same
governing
'mother country,' their reciprocal contacts are very limited . ..
[and they]
form . .. aloof little worlds" (Guerin 1961, 15):
As colonizer, Britain can also be blamed for massive political
un-
derdevelopment and considerable developmental unevenness
from one
British West Indies colony to the next, which would prove
detrimental
to future efforts to federate. This unevenness ranged from
variations in
6

Annual GDP at Real
Average Change in Current GDP per Rate of
Rate of Consumer Market Prices Capita Growth
Unemployment Prices 1988 in in GDP
1988 1988 (in millions 1988 1988
(%) (%) of dollars) dollars (%)
4.5 28.0 3,856 9.7
3.4 321.1 4,123 7.1
11.0 4.7 2,153.1 8,802
17.4 4.8 1,456.9 5,740
15.0 0.4 285.1 1,587 8.3
0.0 132.5 10,685 8.0
5.2 463.2 18,603 15.3
1.7 137.4 1,692 5.6
6.5 166.2 1,675 5.3
45.8 413.8 547 -3.0
18.7 8.8 3,183.3 1,351 1.6
3.6 54.2 4,516 12.4
1.0 108.4 2,521 4.7
0.8 211.4 1,454 6.8
1.6 154.4 1,365 5.0

21.0 7.8 4,481.6 3,699 -3.7
63.1 4,507 19.6
the constitutional status of individual colonies in the British
West Indies to
variances in the amount of political party and semi-ministerial
develop-
ment that was encouraged or allowed. For instance, Barbados
and the
Bahamas maintained the traditional old representative system
with its
largely independent legislature, which often yielded relatively
weak gov-
ernors (especially in Barbados).2 Meanwhile, Jamaica and most
of the
remaining units were governed more directly as Crown
Colonies. Further,
the smaller islands were likely to be assigned colonial
administrators, such
2. For a survey of the great difficulties facing a British
governor in highly nationalistic and
sometimes semi-independent Barbados, see James Pope-
Hennessy (1964).
7
as "the failed Oxford 'passman' [with his] own brand of British
racial
superiority" (G. Lewis 1987, 9). Westminister actively

encouraged uneven
levels of political development within the West Indies,
apparently per-
ceiving that the older, less racially divided colonies of Jamaica
and Bar-
bados were more prepared for party development and semi-
ministerial
status than the other islands and racially bifurcated Guyana. The
West
India Royal Commission (often referred to as the Moyne
Commission)
found that "a substantial body of public opinion in the West
Indies is
convinced that far-reaching measures of social reconstruction
depend,
both for their initiation and their effective administration, upon
greater
participation of the people in the business of government" (U.K.
Colonial
Office 1945, 303). Genuine reluctance in the United Kingdom,
however,
discouraged democratic development in many of its West Indies
colonies
until the eve of independence (Wood 1968; Williams 1970; G.
Lewis 1968).
Jamaica experienced direct involvement by British Labourite
politi-
cians in the formation of the Peoples' National Party (PNP) in
the late
1930s. By 1946 British pressure had brought a kind of cabinet
government
with greater party responsibility to Jamaica and Barbados as
well. On

these two islands and Trinidad, the British provided
considerable assis-
tance in lowering the franchise gates, a course perceived as
"truly conser-
vative" in that it permitted small and gradual changes as an
antidote to
massive protest. This approach contributed to significant
expansion of
suffrage (500 percent in Barbados and an even larger increase in
Jamaica)
in the interlude between the release of the Moyne Report in
1945 and the
West Indies Federation (1958-1962).
Structural Problems and Policy Inconsistencies
On the eve of independence, even such obvious linkage
structures
as trade, personnel, and mail transport remained poorly
developed in the
West Indies. As E. F. L. Wood (later Lord Halifax) observed
during an
official visit to the British West Indies before World War II,
"Jamaica is
separated from the Lesser Antilles and British Guiana by a
journey longer
in time than from England to Jamaica. It would have been
totally out of the
question for us to effect our tour of the West Indian Colonies
had it not
been for the fact that we were conveyed . . . in one of the ships
of His
Majesty's Navy especially detailed for this service.... The postal
author-

ities in Jamaica are usually compelled to send mails for
Trinidad, Bar-
bados, and British Guiana via either England, New, York or
Halifax."3
Compounding the situation were inconsistencies in British
policy, as
3. U.K., Cmd. 1679, quoted in Historical Society of Trinidad
and Tobago, British West In-
dian Federation ([Port of Spain], Trinidad and Tobago:
Government Printing Office, 1954), 49,
47-53.
8
observed by Guyanese writer Clive Thomas. As early as 1882, a
royal
commission proposed an "ultimate" West Indies federation, but
in 1897 a
royal commission opposed such "strong unity" and even
objected to the
integrated civil service that had been proposed earlier. As
Trinidadian Eric
Williams explained, "The West Indian territories were divided,
and so
Britain ruled easily" (Williams 1970, 296).
Such "ease of rule" was eventually threatened by the world de-
pression, however. Following extensive rioting and violence
that caused
almost five hundred casualties between 1935 and 1937, the

previously
noted Moyne Commission was appointed to investigate the
situation.
This body found major problems in colonial policy and
delineated charges
so potentially damaging to support needed by the empire for the
pending
war effort that the Moyne Report was not released until after
World War II.
When finally released in 1945, the Moyne Commission's report
emphasized the need for greater integration among the colonies
of the
British West Indies. But it also stressed the great difficulties to
be con-
fronted in providing the effective and affordable intercolony
transport
and communication infrastructure required for even the most
basic eco-
nomic integration. The report concluded that federation was at
best a far-
off ideal. This finding apparently varied with British policy
because
almost as soon as the report was released, representatives of the
British
government began meeting with British West Indies territorial
represen-
tatives to discuss federation (U.K. Colonial Office 1945, 379ff;
Thomas
1988, 303; Williams 1970, 296).
THE WEST INDIES FEDERATION, 1958-1962
A Policy of Economics First

The demolished infrastructure and economic collapse of the
United
Kingdom resulting from World War II modified the British
agenda for
independence for the British West Indies. These changes
converted what
in 1938 appeared a far-off need to an immediate one, a need "to
force all
the little birds to fly." The loss of India, the Raj's crown jewel,
in 1947
began the countdown of the demise of the second era of
European colo-
nialism. The Caribbean, which had once financed the industrial
revolu-
tion in the United Kingdom by producing wealth then superior
to that of
the North American colonies, was now increasingly perceived
as an
economic liability.
Although British efforts had been made intermittently for
"closer
union" (the title of a 1932 conference), from the initial
settlement in the
1620s to discussions of federation of the British West Indies in
the postwar
period in the 1945 Montego Bay conference, it seems that
Whitehall
actions were not committed to the goal of national viability for
an in-
9

dependent integrated British Caribbean. As Gordon Lewis
reported,
"Examination of the voluminous documentation of ...
Westminister
debates, royal commission reports, Colonial Office memoranda
and the
published correspondence between the Colonial Secretary and
individual
West Indian governors shows that the most persistently
recurring reason
evoked in support of federation was the greater economy and
the im-
proved administrative efficiency it supposed federation would
bring"
(G. Lewis 1968, 345).4
Britain's use of federation as a primary means of advancing
metro-
politan colonial goals rather than assisting its West Indies
colonies to
achieve viable independent nationhood was instrumental in
dooming the
process (Thomas 1979, 285). Even during negotiations, startling
errors
were made that can be laid directly at Whitehall's door:
delaying the
second federation conference until 1953, three years after the
reports were
submitted and after the individual islands learned that they

could gain
separate independence; failing to follow the precedent of earlier
colonial
officers and inform Jamaican Premier Norman Manley that
secession was
unthinkable; and failing to use the Colonial Office's
considerable weight
in resolving pertinent issues ranging from site selection of the
federal
capital5 to transferral of adequate power to the central
government of the
Federation and designating a four-year (rather than a two-year)
period for
constitutional review.
Caribbean Interests and Personality Politics
Many Caribbean leaders have acknowledged for generations
what
Gordon Lewis has termed "the seminal truth": that only an
economically
and politically integrated Caribbean could maximize the
subregion's eco-
nomic and political power and provide insulation against its
provincial
divisions (1968, 343). Thus when formation of the West Indies
Federation
was being negotiated, numerous leaders gave federation their
full sup-
port, at least in the abstract. The Eastern Caribbean, with its
closer
physical and cultural ties, was especially well represented in
federation

talks.
These negotiations were attended by British West Indian
leaders,
4. For the history of this period, see Mordecai (1968, 18-74)
and Levy (1980, 138-59).
5. The eventual selection of Trinidad as the federal capital
certainly did not reassure Jamaica.
The selection process itself exemplified the parochial and
personality fights, economic con-
cerns, and metropolitan mistakes hypothesized at the outset of
this research. Even though
Jamaica was the largest political and economic unit in the West
Indies Federation and was
thus crucially important to the future of the subregion, it was
not chosen as the capital site
because of its relative isolation from the Eastern Caribbean.
Much of the current lack of rap-
port between Jamaica and fellow CARICOM units harks back to
serious integrative neglect
during the colonial era and misunderstandings during the
negotiation periods preceding the
ill-fated West Indies Federation and the Little Eight attempt.
10
except for those from the Bahamas, who were absent along with
represen-
tatives of the mainland territories. Those present advanced a
concerted

demand for federation to the leaders gathered at the Roseau
Conference
held in Dominica in 1932 (Mordecai 1968, 22). Sir Arthur
Lewis charac-
terized three leaders in particular-Norman Manley of Jamaica,
Dr. Eric
Williams of Trinidad-Tobago, and Sir Grantley Adams of
Barbados-as
"men of the highest quality, in any definition of that word.
Their talents
were outstanding, and their education (all three had won
scholarships to
Oxford) the envy of mankind. They were men of immaculate
integrity and
selfless devotion to public service. Each was at the top of his
profession
before entering public life, and gained neither [inordinate]
prestige nor
money from politics. Each would be recognized in any country
in the
world as a public servant of the highest calibre" (W. A. Lewis
1965, 457).
According to Sir Arthur (St. Lucia's Nobel laureate), Manley,
Williams,
and Adams, the political leaders of the three largest states
participating
in the West Indies Federation (1958-1962), were especially
supportive
throughout most of the negotiation period.
Yet the federation collapsed just four years later, and when its
inaugural period was analyzed, the personality politics and
shortsighted-
ness of these same leaders received major blame. Like many
subsequent

Caribbean leaders, these three were first and foremost
provincial nation-
alists who became great men in their home countries but were
hesitant to
accept compromise. Thus the West Indies Federation failed in
part because
its leaders did not accept and utilize this crucial aspect of
nation-building
(W. A. Lewis 1965, 454-62).
"One from Ten Leaves Nought"
These prophetic words were uttered by Trinidad-Tobago
Premier
Dr. Eric Williams when he learned in March 1962 that Jamaica
intended to
pursue singular independence. This action followed the loss by
Norman
Manley and his PNP of a referendum on 19 September 1961 to
Alexander
Bustamante and his Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). The JLP had
mounted a
year-long door-to-door campaign against federation. As
Wendell Bell's
1958 elite survey data indicated, suspicion had arisen that the
federation
might impede eventual full self-government in Jamaica. The
data also

reflected a general feeling that Jamaica would suffer
economically from
federation (Bell 1960, 862-79).
FURTHER ATTEMPTS AT POLITICAL INTEGRATION
The Williams-PNM Response
The referendum results in Jamaica and the negative reaction in
Trinidad spelled bad news for the eastern Caribbean states.
Trinidad's
11
positive participation in the 1932 Roseau Conference
nonetheless sparked
a ray of hope among these states that the federation could
survive the loss
of its largest member. Sir Arthur Lewis's report on a survey of
eastern
Caribbean leaders can be usefully summarized:
Barbadians and the Windward and Leeward Islanders had close
links with
Trinidad; members of their families live there; their songs, their
news, their
political excitements, the novelists who articulate daily
Caribbean life mostly come
from Trinidad. To make foreigners of people so bound by
customs and culture
would come as an immeasurable tragedy which leaders could

not justify in
history... This was a new opportunity to fashion a strong
Federation. While
there was profound sentimental regret at the loss of Jamaica, the
loss was seen as
making possible in the Eastern Caribbean a much more
meaningful and practica-
ble federation. They would start off not only with emotional
ties, quite absent in
the case of Jamaica, but with accustomed patterns of trade and
treatment of mutual
economic problems. Adversity had also assisted them to
overcome their dislike for
Economics of Nationhood [Williams's blueprint for
government], and all were now
ready to consider a strongly centred federation. (W. A. Lewis
1968, 429)
But times had changed since 1959, when Eric Williams had
offered
to fund small-island development. He was now evincing the
bitterness of
the past four years in an increasingly nationalistic and
personalistic tone.
Williams especially abhorred the frequent battles with Grantley
Adams of
Barbados and the even more provincial leaders of the Leeward
and Wind-
ward Islands. Williams also deplored the lack of West Indian
nationalism
and the lack of coherence in the so-called Federal party. At this
point, he
felt that the best opportunity for positive change rested in his
two-island
state and his own Peoples' National Movement (PNM). On 14
January

1962, Williams proposed formation of a unitary state centered
in Trinidad.6
This news was even more shocking to the Leeward and
Windward
Islands and Barbados than Jamaica's withdrawal from the West
Indies
Federation. Except for a brief period of consideration by
Grenada, the
Trinidad proposal was rejected outright.
A Federation of the "Little Eight'?
Of the ten members of the original federation, there remained
only
Barbados and seven smaller British West Indies colonies still
being aided
by metropolitan grants. If Jamaica, a leading bauxite producer
with a
population of two million, and Trinidad, with nearly a million
and the
only substantial oil production in the West Indian territory,
could not
assume the reins of leadership and help "carry" the small and
poorer
islands, how could Barbados take the lead with merely a
quarter-million
people, a scant 166 square miles of relatively unendowed land,
and the
6. See editorials in The [PNM] Nation, 1962, published by the
People's National Movement.
12

lowest income of the "Big Three"? The economic burden
required to bring
the "Little Seven" up to Barbadian standards would be massive
indeed.
Errol Barrow, the newly elected Premier of Barbados, was espe-
cially angered by the Williams-PNM announcement because he
believed
that Williams had assured him that further federation
negotiations would
ensue. Despite this setback, Barrow remained committed to
federation if
joining with smaller neighbors could offer more positives than
negatives
for the economic and political well-being of Barbados. What he
feared
most, like the Jamaican and Trinidadian leaders before him, was
that
union with the Little Seven would engender economic disaster
for his
island and political defeat for him and his party. But with
apparent strong
backing from U.K. Colonial Secretary Reginald Maudling and
active sup-
port from Vere Bird, the leader of Antigua and Barbuda, Barrow
and the
remaining leaders were induced to act immediately to form a
federation of
the Little Eight.

Maudling was informed of this intention the day after the PNM
announced its withdrawal, along with Barrow's two conditions
for stay-
ing the course: that there be no waiting period for independence
for the
remaining eight colonies like that imposed by the United
Kingdom on the
1958-1962 effort; and that the United Kingdom would supply
generous
financial support to advance development of the poorer units in
the
proposed new federation. In just three days, a preliminary
constitution
and budget were drafted. This unusually swift progress
indicated the
substantial degree of interest elicited by the new integrative
movement.
The constitution, which provided much stronger central
authority than
the previous ten-state effort, was sent on its way through the
ratification
process in the insular legislatures by June 1962. Included were
powers
over national income, customs, and excise taxes and a proposed
national
police, a federal judiciary, and sweeping regulatory authority.
Ratification within two years seemed assured and progress ap-
peared excellent, especially in comparison with the previous
effort. But
insurmountable obstacles soon began to intrude into the process.
An
election in St. Lucia produced new faces and new problems; in
Grenada

the scandal-ridden but pro-federation government of Eric Gairy
was re-
placed by the first Herbert Blaize administration, which was
oriented
toward seeking unitary linkage with …

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