Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
Level Up Your Security with
Threat Intelligence
X-Force Exchange and Analytics
ron williams, sr. technical staff member, ibm security
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
x-force exchange analytics & research
•  12M+ SPAM emails analyzed/day
•  12M+ WebSites & 3M+ images
scanned daily
•  7300 Internet Application Profiles
added/yr
•  x-force research collections (zero
index)
•  user contributions (collections)
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
core use case
active threat mitigation
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
anatomy of an attack
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
attack chain
OBSERVATIONS
Src/Dest IP!
Src URL!
Transmitted Files!
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
reconnaissance
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
weaponization
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
delivery
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
exploitation
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
exploitation
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
command & control
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
analyst quest: 
i have an alert, what do I do?
Scenario
SEIM alert

dest IP and/or URL poor reputation

traffic from DB farm, not user network
analyst checklist
1) What do I know about the internet located IP’s, URLs on which the alert triggered?
2) Is this a ‘real’ alert, or false positive
3) If real, what potential business impact might it have? 
4) If impact sufficient, what action should be taken, and when?
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
analyst quest: 
solve the three legged stool
•  url’s: contained in spam, known malware source, IP reputation
•  ip’s: destination for suspicious traffic, known Bad Actor, IP
•  malware: c&c destinations, dropped files, registry keys
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
zero index
•  URL yields IP, both known for
malicious activity
•  Where’s the malware? What is it?
What evidence does it provide? What
properties does it exhibit?
•  Solving the Zero Index requires
associating Source IPs and URLs
with Malware Delivery (dropper URLs)
and C&C (c&c infrastructure)
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
observations
•  zero index solutions (largely) require manual analysis, today
•  network observables in the exploitation phase of a campaign tend to be ephemeral
(minutes/hours)
•  50% of all malware is delivered as part of a SPAM Campaign
•  campaigns are short term (hours, days) attacks against particular targets, finance,
healthcare, infrastructure, etc.
•  zero index sightings at the beginning of a campaign provide valuable and actionable
insights to potential targets
•  zero index sightings have the potential to severely cripple malware campaigns if
disseminated within the first hours of a new campaign
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
the ‘why’ of threat intelligence sharing
•  network observables related to the exploitation phase of an active
campaign tend to be ephemeral
•  timely dissemination of zero index findings can severely hamper a
new campaign, providing currently relevant threat intel to a
community
•  x-force exchange provides for timely dissemination of new threats
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
threat intelligence
sharing
exchange formats and motivation
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
motivation
•  as part of a community, leverage it’s members insights and findings
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
threat sharing languages and protocols
•  The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IETF RFC 5070/IODef)
•  OpenIOC (Mandiant/FireEye)
•  Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE/Mitre)
•  Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE/Mitre)
•  Common Attack Pattern Enumeration & Classification (CAPEC/Mitre)
•  Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC/Mitre)
•  Cyber Observable Expression (CyBox/Mitre)
•  Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX/Mitre/Oasis Open)
•  Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII/Mitre/Oasis Open)
•  and many, many more …
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
STIX & TAXII
•  Structured Threat Information eXpression: STIX
•  Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information: TAXII
•  Version 1.x: STIX/XML & TAXII/XML
•  Version 2.x: STIX/JSON & TAXII/JSON
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
STIX & TAXII
•  Various (US) Presidential Directives since 1997 encouraged Threat
Intelligence Sharing
•  2013 - US DHS Contracts with MITRE Corp to Develop Specification
for Threat Intelligence Sharing
•  STIX/TAXII is born
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
STIX & TAXII Specficiations
•  2014 - Publicly Available Specification (1.0) 
•  2015 - STIX & TAXII moved to newly created Oasis-Open Cyber
Threat Intelligence Group

1.x Oasis Specification Finalized (XML)

2.x STIX & TAXII Specifications commenced (JSON)

Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
why STIX?
The information being managed and exchanged today is typically very
atomic, inconsistent, and very limited in sophistication and expressivity
•  relationships, not just indicators
•  consistency of semantics and use
•  identifying the ‘big picture’
•  standard language to express, obtain, and share threat information
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
STIX information model
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
STIX/TAXII and x-force exchange
•  ibm indicators available via TAXII service in STIX format
•  x-force exchange ‘collections’ available via STIX/TAXII & JSON
•  collections import of STIX documents via TAXII inbox
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation
join the community
•  share your insights
•  gain other’s
•  make threat intelligence sharing a
reality
•  https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com
Copyright 2016 IBM Corporation

Level Up Your Security with Threat Intelligence

  • 1.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation Level Up Your Security with Threat Intelligence X-Force Exchange and Analytics ron williams, sr. technical staff member, ibm security
  • 2.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation x-force exchange analytics & research •  12M+ SPAM emails analyzed/day •  12M+ WebSites & 3M+ images scanned daily •  7300 Internet Application Profiles added/yr •  x-force research collections (zero index) •  user contributions (collections)
  • 3.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com
  • 4.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation core use case active threat mitigation
  • 5.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation anatomy of an attack
  • 6.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation attack chain OBSERVATIONS Src/Dest IP! Src URL! Transmitted Files!
  • 7.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation reconnaissance
  • 8.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation weaponization
  • 9.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation delivery
  • 10.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation exploitation
  • 11.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation exploitation
  • 12.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation command & control
  • 13.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation analyst quest: i have an alert, what do I do? Scenario SEIM alert
 dest IP and/or URL poor reputation
 traffic from DB farm, not user network analyst checklist 1) What do I know about the internet located IP’s, URLs on which the alert triggered? 2) Is this a ‘real’ alert, or false positive 3) If real, what potential business impact might it have? 4) If impact sufficient, what action should be taken, and when?
  • 14.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation analyst quest: solve the three legged stool •  url’s: contained in spam, known malware source, IP reputation •  ip’s: destination for suspicious traffic, known Bad Actor, IP •  malware: c&c destinations, dropped files, registry keys
  • 15.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation zero index •  URL yields IP, both known for malicious activity •  Where’s the malware? What is it? What evidence does it provide? What properties does it exhibit? •  Solving the Zero Index requires associating Source IPs and URLs with Malware Delivery (dropper URLs) and C&C (c&c infrastructure)
  • 16.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation observations •  zero index solutions (largely) require manual analysis, today •  network observables in the exploitation phase of a campaign tend to be ephemeral (minutes/hours) •  50% of all malware is delivered as part of a SPAM Campaign •  campaigns are short term (hours, days) attacks against particular targets, finance, healthcare, infrastructure, etc. •  zero index sightings at the beginning of a campaign provide valuable and actionable insights to potential targets •  zero index sightings have the potential to severely cripple malware campaigns if disseminated within the first hours of a new campaign
  • 17.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation the ‘why’ of threat intelligence sharing •  network observables related to the exploitation phase of an active campaign tend to be ephemeral •  timely dissemination of zero index findings can severely hamper a new campaign, providing currently relevant threat intel to a community •  x-force exchange provides for timely dissemination of new threats
  • 18.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation threat intelligence sharing exchange formats and motivation
  • 19.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation motivation •  as part of a community, leverage it’s members insights and findings
  • 20.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation threat sharing languages and protocols •  The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IETF RFC 5070/IODef) •  OpenIOC (Mandiant/FireEye) •  Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE/Mitre) •  Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE/Mitre) •  Common Attack Pattern Enumeration & Classification (CAPEC/Mitre) •  Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC/Mitre) •  Cyber Observable Expression (CyBox/Mitre) •  Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX/Mitre/Oasis Open) •  Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII/Mitre/Oasis Open) •  and many, many more …
  • 21.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation STIX & TAXII •  Structured Threat Information eXpression: STIX •  Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information: TAXII •  Version 1.x: STIX/XML & TAXII/XML •  Version 2.x: STIX/JSON & TAXII/JSON
  • 22.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation STIX & TAXII •  Various (US) Presidential Directives since 1997 encouraged Threat Intelligence Sharing •  2013 - US DHS Contracts with MITRE Corp to Develop Specification for Threat Intelligence Sharing •  STIX/TAXII is born
  • 23.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation STIX & TAXII Specficiations •  2014 - Publicly Available Specification (1.0) •  2015 - STIX & TAXII moved to newly created Oasis-Open Cyber Threat Intelligence Group
 1.x Oasis Specification Finalized (XML)
 2.x STIX & TAXII Specifications commenced (JSON)

  • 24.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation why STIX? The information being managed and exchanged today is typically very atomic, inconsistent, and very limited in sophistication and expressivity •  relationships, not just indicators •  consistency of semantics and use •  identifying the ‘big picture’ •  standard language to express, obtain, and share threat information
  • 25.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation STIX information model
  • 26.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation STIX/TAXII and x-force exchange •  ibm indicators available via TAXII service in STIX format •  x-force exchange ‘collections’ available via STIX/TAXII & JSON •  collections import of STIX documents via TAXII inbox
  • 27.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation join the community •  share your insights •  gain other’s •  make threat intelligence sharing a reality •  https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com
  • 28.
    Copyright 2016 IBMCorporation