THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
1
PAUL JAUREGUI
VP, SECURING IOT @ PRAETORIAN
RICHARD MCPHERSON
PHD CANDIDATE, INTERN, PRAETORIAN (2015)
NISHIL SHAH
UT GRADUATE, INTERN, PRAETORIAN (2015)
DALLAS KAMAN
SENIOR SECURITY ENGINEER, PRAETORIAN
Internet of Things Map Project Team | Summer 2015 and beyond
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
2 Praetorian Partnered with DroneSense (dronesense.com)
for FAA Exemption and Autonomous Drone Automation
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
3 Praetorian Partnered with DroneSense (dronesense.com)
for FAA Exemption and Autonomous Drone Automation
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
4 Praetorian Partnered with DroneSense (dronesense.com)
for FAA Exemption and Autonomous Drone Automation
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
5 Praetorian Partnered with DroneSense (dronesense.com)
for FAA Exemption and Autonomous Drone Automation
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
6 Praetorian Partnered with DroneSense (dronesense.com)
for FAA Exemption and Autonomous Drone Automation
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
7
RESEARCH MEDIA AWARENESS
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Capture Device (v1.0) Specifications and Requirements
8
ZIGBEE RADIOS
Atmel RZUSBstick (x8)
Flashed custom firmware
GPS MODULE
Adafruit GPS HAT
for Raspberry Pi
RASPBERRY PI
Model B+ 512MB RAM
Raspbian OS
‣ Autonomous operation
‣ Hand-held size
‣ Under 250 grams
‣ Battery powered (Drone’s)
‣ Discover all Zigbee
devices within 150-feet
across all 16 channels in
under 10-seconds while
traveling 10-20mph

THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Extending Killerbee 802.15.4 Network Attacking Framework
9
11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
2400MHz 2483MHz2.4GHz Zigbee Channels
PROCESS 1
PROCESS 2
PROCESS 3
17
‣ Extended Killerbee
zbwardrive utility
‣ Added new Python
multiprocessing
‣ All Zigbee radios cycle
through channels
simultaneously
‣ Channels record for a set
amount of time
DOWNLOAD KILLERBEE FRAMEWORK AT HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/RIVERLOOPSEC/KILLERBEE
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Extending Killerbee 802.15.4 Network Attacking Framework
10
11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
2400MHz 2483MHz2.4GHz Zigbee Channels
PROCESS 1
PROCESS 2
PROCESS 3
17
‣ Extended Killerbee
zbwardrive utility
‣ Added new Python
multiprocessing
‣ All Zigbee radios cycle
through channels
simultaneously
‣ Channels record for a set
amount of time
DOWNLOAD KILLERBEE FRAMEWORK AT HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/RIVERLOOPSEC/KILLERBEE
Step 1: All connected Zigbee radios send
beacon request on assigned to channel
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Extending Killerbee 802.15.4 Network Attacking Framework
11
11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
2400MHz 2483MHz2.4GHz Zigbee Channels
PROCESS 1
PROCESS 2
PROCESS 3
17
Found Something!
** Listen for 10 sec **
‣ Extended Killerbee
zbwardrive utility
‣ Added new Python
multiprocessing
‣ All Zigbee radios cycle
through channels
simultaneously
‣ Channels record for a set
amount of time
DOWNLOAD KILLERBEE FRAMEWORK AT HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/RIVERLOOPSEC/KILLERBEE
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Extending Killerbee 802.15.4 Network Attacking Framework
12
11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
2400MHz 2483MHz2.4GHz Zigbee Channels
PROCESS 1
PROCESS 2
PROCESS 3
17
Found Something!
** Listen for 10 sec **
‣ Extended Killerbee
zbwardrive utility
‣ Added new Python
multiprocessing
‣ All Zigbee radios cycle
through channels
simultaneously
‣ Channels record for a set
amount of time
DOWNLOAD KILLERBEE FRAMEWORK AT HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/RIVERLOOPSEC/KILLERBEE
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Post-processing Engine: Fingerprinting Methodology
13
4. | Analyze Zigbee Traffic and Fingerprint Devices with Company MAC address
Philips Hue Smart Lighting
Network Identified
TCP/Greenwave Lighting
Network Identified
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
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14
praetorian.com/iotmap
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
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15
praetorian.com/iotmap
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
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16
praetorian.com/iotmap
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
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Mesh
Network
Basic Smart Lighting Architecture / Attack Surface
17
CLOUD SERVICES
Internet WiFi Router Lighting Gateway Remote
INTERNAL NETWORKEXTERNAL
WiFiCellular
Mobile apps
Sensor
6LoWPAN	
Z-wave	
and	more
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Mesh
Network
Basic Smart Lighting Architecture / Attack Surface
18
CLOUD SERVICES
Internet WiFi Router Remote
INTERNAL NETWORKEXTERNAL
WiFiCellular
Mobile apps
Sensor
6LoWPAN	
Z-wave	
and	more
Lighting Gateway
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Embedded Device Hacking with Physical Access
19
TX RX Ground UART	Port
Gained persistent root access to device via
SSH server, which runs on boot up

‣ Connected test points on board to UART adapter for
“Kernel Init Hijacking”
‣ “Kernel Init Hijacking” allows temporary Root access to
TCP Hub file system by tampering with the boot
sequence and injecting commands
‣ Access used to retrieve root SSH password, which was
“thinkgreen” and shared by all TCP Gateways
‣ Potential to also remotely install malicious software
that turns the hub into a proxy to the network, could
sniff/exfiltrate data, or launch attacks on other systems
INDEPENDENT RESEARCH
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Embedded Device Hacking with Physical Access
20
In January 2015, Greenwave forced a firmware
update that fixed these issues



✓ Removed local web control interface that lacked
authentication by closing port 80

✓ Opened a secure HTTPS (port 443) service with currently
unknown functionality

✓ Close the SSH (port 22) service to remove persistent Root
access to hub via SSH credentials share by all devices

✓ UART pins may have been silenced, and boot delay may
have been set to zero (no more “kernel init hijacking”)


UART	Pins	Silenced
INDEPENDENT RESEARCH
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Common Security Challenges in Product Development Lifecycle
21
ResearchTime to market pressures
Testing
Security is often left
as an afterthought
Support
Ongoing security support
and maintenance
Launch
Develop
General lack of
security consciousness
Insufficient security
testing prior to launch
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Internet of Things (IoT) — End-to-end Security Considerations
22
EMBEDDED DEVICES
Physical and logical threats to embedded systems
DEVICE FIRMWARE
Device firmware and update distribution process
WIRELESS PROTOCOLS
Local wireless communication protocols (M2M)
APPLICATIONS
Web applications, mobile apps, 3rd-party integrations
CLOUD SERVICES
Web services, RESTful APIs, analytics, 3rd-party services
INFRASTRUCTURE
Back-end systems, networks, servers, and data
INTERNET OF THINGS
END-TO-END SECURITY
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Internet of Things (IoT) — End-to-end Security Considerations
23
EMBEDDED DEVICES
Physical and logical threats to embedded systems
DEVICE FIRMWARE
Device firmware and update distribution process
WIRELESS PROTOCOLS
Local wireless communication protocols (M2M)
APPLICATIONS
Web applications, mobile apps, 3rd-party integrations
CLOUD SERVICES
Web services, RESTful APIs, analytics, 3rd-party services
INFRASTRUCTURE
Back-end systems, networks, servers, and data
TX RX Ground UART	Port INDEPENDENT RESEARCH
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Internet of Things (IoT) — End-to-end Security Considerations
24
EMBEDDED DEVICES
Physical and logical threats to embedded systems
DEVICE FIRMWARE
Device firmware and update distribution process
WIRELESS PROTOCOLS
Local wireless communication protocols (M2M)
APPLICATIONS
Web applications, mobile apps, 3rd-party integrations
CLOUD SERVICES
Web services, RESTful APIs, analytics, 3rd-party services
INFRASTRUCTURE
Back-end systems, networks, servers, and data
CVE-2015-6949 - October 2015
Praetorian Security Researcher
recognized by ASUS for responsible
disclosure of a zero-day vulnerability
affecting all ASUS router firmware
Zero-day Impact:
Remote Code Execution (RCE)
INDEPENDENT RESEARCH
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Internet of Things (IoT) — End-to-end Security Considerations
25
EMBEDDED DEVICES
Physical and logical threats to embedded systems
DEVICE FIRMWARE
Device firmware and update distribution process
WIRELESS PROTOCOLS
Local wireless communication protocols (M2M)
APPLICATIONS
Web applications, mobile apps, 3rd-party integrations
CLOUD SERVICES
Web services, RESTful APIs, analytics, 3rd-party services
INFRASTRUCTURE
Back-end systems, networks, servers, and data
INDEPENDENT RESEARCH
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Internet of Things (IoT) — End-to-end Security Considerations
26
EMBEDDED DEVICES
Physical and logical threats to embedded systems
DEVICE FIRMWARE
Device firmware and update distribution process
WIRELESS PROTOCOLS
Local wireless communication protocols (M2M)
APPLICATIONS
Web applications, mobile apps, 3rd-party integrations
CLOUD SERVICES
Web services, RESTful APIs, analytics, 3rd-party services
INFRASTRUCTURE
Back-end systems, networks, servers, and data
CLOUD SERVICES
Internet WiFi Router
HOME LOCAL AREA NETWORKEXTERNAL
WiFiCellular
Mobile apps
IoT Device/Gateway
Sensors
Mesh
Networks
THE SECURITY EXPERTS
WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM
Recommended Security Best Practices
27
Research
Train employees about
security best practices
Testing
Conduct 3rd-party
security risk assessments
Support
Monitor product through
its life, patch known vulns
Launch
Develop
Build security in from the
start, don’t bolt it on
Test end-to-end security
before product launch
NETWORK APPLICATION MOBILE CLOUD IOT
Internet of Things Map Project
Exploring Risk & Mapping the Internet of Things with Autonomous Drones

Exploring Risk and Mapping the Internet of Things with Autonomous Drones

  • 1.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM 1 PAULJAUREGUI VP, SECURING IOT @ PRAETORIAN RICHARD MCPHERSON PHD CANDIDATE, INTERN, PRAETORIAN (2015) NISHIL SHAH UT GRADUATE, INTERN, PRAETORIAN (2015) DALLAS KAMAN SENIOR SECURITY ENGINEER, PRAETORIAN Internet of Things Map Project Team | Summer 2015 and beyond
  • 2.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM 2Praetorian Partnered with DroneSense (dronesense.com) for FAA Exemption and Autonomous Drone Automation
  • 3.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM 3Praetorian Partnered with DroneSense (dronesense.com) for FAA Exemption and Autonomous Drone Automation
  • 4.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM 4Praetorian Partnered with DroneSense (dronesense.com) for FAA Exemption and Autonomous Drone Automation
  • 5.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM 5Praetorian Partnered with DroneSense (dronesense.com) for FAA Exemption and Autonomous Drone Automation
  • 6.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM 6Praetorian Partnered with DroneSense (dronesense.com) for FAA Exemption and Autonomous Drone Automation
  • 7.
  • 8.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM CaptureDevice (v1.0) Specifications and Requirements 8 ZIGBEE RADIOS Atmel RZUSBstick (x8) Flashed custom firmware GPS MODULE Adafruit GPS HAT for Raspberry Pi RASPBERRY PI Model B+ 512MB RAM Raspbian OS ‣ Autonomous operation ‣ Hand-held size ‣ Under 250 grams ‣ Battery powered (Drone’s) ‣ Discover all Zigbee devices within 150-feet across all 16 channels in under 10-seconds while traveling 10-20mph

  • 9.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM ExtendingKillerbee 802.15.4 Network Attacking Framework 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2400MHz 2483MHz2.4GHz Zigbee Channels PROCESS 1 PROCESS 2 PROCESS 3 17 ‣ Extended Killerbee zbwardrive utility ‣ Added new Python multiprocessing ‣ All Zigbee radios cycle through channels simultaneously ‣ Channels record for a set amount of time DOWNLOAD KILLERBEE FRAMEWORK AT HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/RIVERLOOPSEC/KILLERBEE
  • 10.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM ExtendingKillerbee 802.15.4 Network Attacking Framework 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2400MHz 2483MHz2.4GHz Zigbee Channels PROCESS 1 PROCESS 2 PROCESS 3 17 ‣ Extended Killerbee zbwardrive utility ‣ Added new Python multiprocessing ‣ All Zigbee radios cycle through channels simultaneously ‣ Channels record for a set amount of time DOWNLOAD KILLERBEE FRAMEWORK AT HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/RIVERLOOPSEC/KILLERBEE Step 1: All connected Zigbee radios send beacon request on assigned to channel
  • 11.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM ExtendingKillerbee 802.15.4 Network Attacking Framework 11 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2400MHz 2483MHz2.4GHz Zigbee Channels PROCESS 1 PROCESS 2 PROCESS 3 17 Found Something! ** Listen for 10 sec ** ‣ Extended Killerbee zbwardrive utility ‣ Added new Python multiprocessing ‣ All Zigbee radios cycle through channels simultaneously ‣ Channels record for a set amount of time DOWNLOAD KILLERBEE FRAMEWORK AT HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/RIVERLOOPSEC/KILLERBEE
  • 12.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM ExtendingKillerbee 802.15.4 Network Attacking Framework 12 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2400MHz 2483MHz2.4GHz Zigbee Channels PROCESS 1 PROCESS 2 PROCESS 3 17 Found Something! ** Listen for 10 sec ** ‣ Extended Killerbee zbwardrive utility ‣ Added new Python multiprocessing ‣ All Zigbee radios cycle through channels simultaneously ‣ Channels record for a set amount of time DOWNLOAD KILLERBEE FRAMEWORK AT HTTPS://GITHUB.COM/RIVERLOOPSEC/KILLERBEE
  • 13.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM Post-processingEngine: Fingerprinting Methodology 13 4. | Analyze Zigbee Traffic and Fingerprint Devices with Company MAC address Philips Hue Smart Lighting Network Identified TCP/Greenwave Lighting Network Identified
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 17.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM Mesh Network BasicSmart Lighting Architecture / Attack Surface 17 CLOUD SERVICES Internet WiFi Router Lighting Gateway Remote INTERNAL NETWORKEXTERNAL WiFiCellular Mobile apps Sensor 6LoWPAN Z-wave and more
  • 18.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM Mesh Network BasicSmart Lighting Architecture / Attack Surface 18 CLOUD SERVICES Internet WiFi Router Remote INTERNAL NETWORKEXTERNAL WiFiCellular Mobile apps Sensor 6LoWPAN Z-wave and more Lighting Gateway
  • 19.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM EmbeddedDevice Hacking with Physical Access 19 TX RX Ground UART Port Gained persistent root access to device via SSH server, which runs on boot up
 ‣ Connected test points on board to UART adapter for “Kernel Init Hijacking” ‣ “Kernel Init Hijacking” allows temporary Root access to TCP Hub file system by tampering with the boot sequence and injecting commands ‣ Access used to retrieve root SSH password, which was “thinkgreen” and shared by all TCP Gateways ‣ Potential to also remotely install malicious software that turns the hub into a proxy to the network, could sniff/exfiltrate data, or launch attacks on other systems INDEPENDENT RESEARCH
  • 20.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM EmbeddedDevice Hacking with Physical Access 20 In January 2015, Greenwave forced a firmware update that fixed these issues
 
 ✓ Removed local web control interface that lacked authentication by closing port 80
 ✓ Opened a secure HTTPS (port 443) service with currently unknown functionality
 ✓ Close the SSH (port 22) service to remove persistent Root access to hub via SSH credentials share by all devices
 ✓ UART pins may have been silenced, and boot delay may have been set to zero (no more “kernel init hijacking”)
 
UART Pins Silenced INDEPENDENT RESEARCH
  • 21.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM CommonSecurity Challenges in Product Development Lifecycle 21 ResearchTime to market pressures Testing Security is often left as an afterthought Support Ongoing security support and maintenance Launch Develop General lack of security consciousness Insufficient security testing prior to launch
  • 22.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM Internetof Things (IoT) — End-to-end Security Considerations 22 EMBEDDED DEVICES Physical and logical threats to embedded systems DEVICE FIRMWARE Device firmware and update distribution process WIRELESS PROTOCOLS Local wireless communication protocols (M2M) APPLICATIONS Web applications, mobile apps, 3rd-party integrations CLOUD SERVICES Web services, RESTful APIs, analytics, 3rd-party services INFRASTRUCTURE Back-end systems, networks, servers, and data INTERNET OF THINGS END-TO-END SECURITY
  • 23.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM Internetof Things (IoT) — End-to-end Security Considerations 23 EMBEDDED DEVICES Physical and logical threats to embedded systems DEVICE FIRMWARE Device firmware and update distribution process WIRELESS PROTOCOLS Local wireless communication protocols (M2M) APPLICATIONS Web applications, mobile apps, 3rd-party integrations CLOUD SERVICES Web services, RESTful APIs, analytics, 3rd-party services INFRASTRUCTURE Back-end systems, networks, servers, and data TX RX Ground UART Port INDEPENDENT RESEARCH
  • 24.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM Internetof Things (IoT) — End-to-end Security Considerations 24 EMBEDDED DEVICES Physical and logical threats to embedded systems DEVICE FIRMWARE Device firmware and update distribution process WIRELESS PROTOCOLS Local wireless communication protocols (M2M) APPLICATIONS Web applications, mobile apps, 3rd-party integrations CLOUD SERVICES Web services, RESTful APIs, analytics, 3rd-party services INFRASTRUCTURE Back-end systems, networks, servers, and data CVE-2015-6949 - October 2015 Praetorian Security Researcher recognized by ASUS for responsible disclosure of a zero-day vulnerability affecting all ASUS router firmware Zero-day Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE) INDEPENDENT RESEARCH
  • 25.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM Internetof Things (IoT) — End-to-end Security Considerations 25 EMBEDDED DEVICES Physical and logical threats to embedded systems DEVICE FIRMWARE Device firmware and update distribution process WIRELESS PROTOCOLS Local wireless communication protocols (M2M) APPLICATIONS Web applications, mobile apps, 3rd-party integrations CLOUD SERVICES Web services, RESTful APIs, analytics, 3rd-party services INFRASTRUCTURE Back-end systems, networks, servers, and data INDEPENDENT RESEARCH
  • 26.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM Internetof Things (IoT) — End-to-end Security Considerations 26 EMBEDDED DEVICES Physical and logical threats to embedded systems DEVICE FIRMWARE Device firmware and update distribution process WIRELESS PROTOCOLS Local wireless communication protocols (M2M) APPLICATIONS Web applications, mobile apps, 3rd-party integrations CLOUD SERVICES Web services, RESTful APIs, analytics, 3rd-party services INFRASTRUCTURE Back-end systems, networks, servers, and data CLOUD SERVICES Internet WiFi Router HOME LOCAL AREA NETWORKEXTERNAL WiFiCellular Mobile apps IoT Device/Gateway Sensors Mesh Networks
  • 27.
    THE SECURITY EXPERTS WWW.PRAETORIAN.COM RecommendedSecurity Best Practices 27 Research Train employees about security best practices Testing Conduct 3rd-party security risk assessments Support Monitor product through its life, patch known vulns Launch Develop Build security in from the start, don’t bolt it on Test end-to-end security before product launch
  • 28.
    NETWORK APPLICATION MOBILECLOUD IOT Internet of Things Map Project Exploring Risk & Mapping the Internet of Things with Autonomous Drones