How I tested AI security with malicious prompts

This title was summarized by AI from the post below.

I split a malicious prompt across three workflow nodes last week. Each input was completely harmless in isolation.  The system executed perfectly. And exfiltrated exactly what I targeted.  That test changed how I think about AI security.  Single-point validation—the foundation of every security tool I've used—is obsolete for multi-node systems.  Here's why:  Traditional approach: Validate each input individually  ? "Is THIS prompt malicious?"  Multi-node reality: Harmless inputs combine into threats  ? "Are THESE FOUR prompts malicious when executed in sequence?"  Current tools can't answer the second question.  The attack patterns I've considered testing:  ? Template Trojans: Shared prompts that trigger only in specific workflow contexts  ? Incremental Exfiltration: Legitimate requests that cumulatively create data pipelines  ? API Response Hijacks: Third-party data that embeds instructions within response text  None trigger traditional security alerts. The threat emerges from composition, not content.  The uncomfortable truth:  Multi-node workflows have exponentially more attack surfaces than single-node systems. Yet most organizations still rely on keyword filtering at best.  Most platforms (n8n, Make, Zapier) were designed for efficiency, not security. There's no built-in concept of "validate this workflow end-to-end for distributed malicious intent."  The architecture itself is the attack surface.  I wrote about what I learned—and why distributed attacks are fundamentally harder to defend against:  https://lnkd.in/g3dNDSYp  Are your AI workflows validating inputs or sequences? #AIWorkflowSecurity #AIAgentSecurity #EnterpriseAI #AutomationSecurity #ThreatIntelligence #CyberSecurity

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